The future of the Russia–Ukraine conflict increasingly depends on control of the skies: Kyiv’s drones to slow Russian advances and strike targets and energy infrastructure inside Russia, and Moscow’s ballistic missiles to hit Ukrainian cities and military sites. A shortage of Patriot interceptors, the U.S.-made missiles, is increasingly felt and benefits Russia’s attrition strategy. “Russia’s strategy rests on a cold calculation: to wear down Ukrainian defenses before its own protective network collapses,” the New York Times writes.

Kyiv is indeed testing Russian defenses and now strikes Russian territory far more frequently than in the early stages of the war, hitting military targets located hundreds of kilometers from the front line, which is largely stalemated at present. The Wall Street Journal notes that Ukraine “knows it must do more than simply shoot down Putin’s missiles, which is why it is conducting a campaign of deep strikes into Russian territory.” In recent weeks Russian oil installations have been hit from Siberia to Saint Petersburg, and ports from the Baltic to the Black Sea. Occupied Crimea has again become a target for Kyiv, as have the warehouses of the Russian e‐commerce giant Wildberries, which Ukraine hits regularly.

In July, Moscow launched at least 126 ballistic missiles — the highest monthly total since the war began — according to a New York Times analysis based on Ukrainian Air Force data. Russian bombardments, which also included cruise missiles and drones, caused about 400 civilian casualties, making July the deadliest month since April 2022. “Beyond the human toll, the Russian attacks forced Ukraine to suspend major grain and steel exports through its ports. The bombings also worsened damage to already heavily hit infrastructure, raising fears the country could face another winter of severe heating and power shortages,” the U.S. daily highlights, noting that the conflict “is now, in effect, two parallel wars. The first is fought relentlessly by infantry and drone operators along more than 1,300 kilometers of front. Russia keeps trying to seize Ukrainian territory at the cost of tens of thousands of soldiers each month, slowly advancing in the eastern Donbas region. Ukraine, with a smaller army, defends its land and, where possible, tries to retake ground, especially in the south.”

The second war, the NYT observes, “comes from the sky in waves, striking cities and military sites far from the front in both countries, often at night, and has become increasingly lethal for both Ukrainians and Russians. The targets of these strikes go beyond strictly military objectives. Kyiv aims to increase the economic costs to the Kremlin, bring the war onto Russian territory and pressure President Vladimir Putin to accept a ceasefire not dictated solely by Moscow. For Russia, the aerial campaign continues a multi‐year strategy to erode Ukraine’s capacity to resist and make cities progressively less livable.”

The battle in the skies is intensifying as both sides produce more sophisticated weapons in greater numbers. The New York Times reports that Russia “has begun fitting jet engines to inexpensive drones derived from Iran’s Shahed models, is launching a constellation of satellites to improve weapon guidance, and is developing low‐cost cruise missiles to bridge the gap between slow attack drones and more advanced strategic missiles. Russian fighters are also using satellite‐guided glide bombs that systematically destroy towns and population centers.” Ukraine, the paper adds, “is producing an evolving arsenal of drones and hybrid drone‐missile systems with advanced navigation and communications that allow for more precise deep strikes into Russia. President Volodymyr Zelensky has vowed to accelerate the aerial campaign while Kyiv is testing the first ballistic missiles fully produced domestically. Both sides are introducing new systems to counter electronic jamming and increasingly rely on autonomous systems that can guide weapons to targets without human intervention.”

But as Russia and Ukraine expand their offensive arsenals, air defenses are struggling to keep pace. Kyiv suffers from a severe shortage of U.S.-made Patriot interceptors, which are among the few systems capable of effectively countering Russian ballistic missiles. The global depletion of stockpiles, partly due to the war with Iran, makes the problem harder to solve, especially after U.S. President Donald Trump stepped back from a promise to allow Ukraine to produce Patriots on its own soil in the future. “I was shocked by the number of Patriots we have fired,” said retired U.S. Navy Rear Admiral Mark Montgomery in an interview on the Potomac Watch podcast this week, quoted by the Wall Street Journal. The United States may have “expended about 2,300” interceptors. By comparison, “we have supplied 600 to Ukraine, many of which were older systems and provided through other partners,” he explained.

Zelensky has tasked his diplomats with intensifying efforts to persuade allies to provide additional Patriot systems. NATO has signaled support, with Secretary‐General Mark Rutte saying he is “discussing with Allies how we can continue to provide Ukraine the air defenses it urgently needs.” Meanwhile, Kyiv is seeking a Plan B. Today Zelensky attended a meeting on the development of Ukraine’s ballistic capabilities and on the status of the Freyja anti‐missile program, which could cost up to five times less than Patriot PAC‐3 missiles and become the cornerstone of a future “Anti‐Ballistic Coalition” led by European countries. “Developing national ballistic capabilities and building a new anti‐missile defense system,” Zelensky wrote on X, “is an objective few countries in the world have achieved. Ukraine has that capacity. Ukrainians have the scientific bases and the required expertise. Our domestic arms producers have reached the necessary level. We expect Ukraine to achieve the planned results in 2026–2027.” He added that the Freyja program “is advancing, and this is an important element. Europe needs a common, truly large‐scale capability to defend itself effectively from any ballistic threat. We support and expect other partner countries that can make concrete contributions to join the Anti‐Ballistic Coalition. We also discussed cooperation with partners on PAC‐2 and PAC‐3 missiles. I expect results from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense in their contacts with partners already identified and repeatedly mentioned.”

For Russia, the main challenge at this stage of the war that began with the February 24, 2022 invasion is now “defending an immense territory that, once a strategic advantage, has become a vulnerability because Ukraine is producing a growing number of long‐range drones,” the New York Times observes. By adapting software, electronic components and operational tactics, Kyiv has managed to create gaps in what was once considered one of the world’s most effective air‐defense networks. Anatolii Khrapchynskyi, a reserve officer of the Ukrainian Air Force and military analyst, says that before the large‐scale invasion of 2022 Russia mainly relied on nuclear deterrence. “Air defenses,” he explained, “could only protect about 40% of strategic military infrastructure.” When the invasion stalled and Moscow failed to achieve air superiority, Russian command moved defensive systems such as Pantsir and Tor closer to the Ukrainian border. That choice strengthened frontline protection but left military bases and industrial infrastructure in the country’s interior more exposed.

Analysts say every radar or missile system destroyed today forces Moscow to choose whether to protect the front or the national territory. “Russia’s problem is fundamentally geographic,” notes Justin Bronk, a senior researcher at the Royal United Services Institute in London, cited by the NYT. “When Ukraine forces Moscow to pull defensive systems from the front to protect cities or refineries inland, new vulnerabilities inevitably emerge.” While Russia still maintains a robust air‐defense network, the pressure has fragmented its system into isolated coverage areas, vulnerabilities Kyiv exploits by striking deep targets inside Russia as well as logistic infrastructure nearer the front. “To plug these emerging gaps, Russia has resorted to temporary solutions, such as installing Pantsir batteries on the roofs of very tall buildings to improve sight lines and using naval units to protect northern regions like Murmansk,” the NYT observes.

“Where Ukraine still cannot match Russia is industrial capacity. Moscow mass‐produces thousands of standardized attack drones, loitering munitions and cruise missiles. According to Ukrainian intelligence, Russia builds about 120 ballistic missiles each month, a quantity higher than the entire U.S. production of Patriot interceptors. The Russian arsenal is also bolstered by missiles supplied by North Korea, Ukrainian officials say, citing evidence from wreckage of the strike last Thursday on the city of Kryvyi Rih in central Ukraine, which killed ten members of the same family. Moscow is also developing its own interceptor drones, a technology Ukraine has already used successfully, and continues to field significant numbers of advanced S‐400 and S‐300 air‐defense systems. A decisive factor is the Russian defense industry’s ability to keep supply chains running despite international sanctions, relying on foreign microelectronic components and dual‐use Chinese technologies to quickly upgrade its systems,” the New York Times emphasizes.

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