Lauri Hussar speaks from Rome, but his message is relevant to all of Europe. President of the Riigikogu, the Estonian Parliament, and a longtime journalist before entering politics, Hussar is now one of the clearest voices from the Nordic-Baltic front on Russia’s war against Ukraine, NATO deterrence, and the need to strengthen European defence.

Elected to lead the Estonian Parliament in 2023 and reconfirmed in March 2026, Hussar belongs to a political generation shaped by the memory of Soviet occupation and by the understanding that security is never an abstract concept for the Baltic countries. Estonia has decided to raise its military spending to 5.4% of GDP, one of the highest shares in the Atlantic Alliance. In Tallinn this is seen not as a symbolic gesture but as a strategic necessity.

In this interview with Adnkronos, Hussar links defence policy to the very survival of European sovereignty. “Russia remains a long-term threat,” he says. According to the president of the Estonian Parliament, Vladimir Putin’s objective is not to stop at Ukraine but to “restore the Soviet Union and build a Russian empire.” For this reason, he argues, the Western response must follow three lines: military and financial support for Kyiv, increasing the cost of aggression for Moscow through additional sanctions, and full international accountability for crimes committed by Russia, starting with a special court for the crime of aggression.

Hussar also rejects the narrative, amplified by Russian propaganda and echoed in various forms in Western debate, that the Baltic countries are preparing provocations against Moscow. “It’s completely false,” he says. “These are propaganda arguments used to shift attention away from the fact that Russia is weak, that Ukraine can strike strategic infrastructure, and that Moscow is losing the initiative.”

Mr. President Hussar, let’s start with defence. In Italy, increasing military spending is politically sensitive. Estonia, however, has reached 5.4% of GDP. What would you say to the Italian public and politicians to explain the urgency of this choice?

We did it deliberately. A few years ago our defence spending was at 2% of GDP; then we decided to increase it to 5.4%. The reason is clear: Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and Russia’s aggressive behaviour.

We know Russia will remain a long-term threat to Europe. Its aim is not to stop in Ukraine but to go further. As members of NATO and the European Union, we must be as solid and strong as possible. We need excellent deterrence, built together with allies but also with the maximum national effort. We must make sure Russia never dares to attack.

For us it is a matter of security and sovereignty. In Estonia we have a very strong allied presence: British, American, French forces. We have also had the Italian air policing mission and cooperation with Italy has been excellent.

This shows how NATO works and also what our contribution is. We will contribute to collective defence in all areas, including the security of the southern flank. But the central point is that today we must think about security-how to be strong and taken seriously after everything that has happened.

Our primary concern remains Russia’s war against Ukraine. It is clear that Putin does not want it to end. His objectives have not changed: he wants to restore the Soviet Union and build a Russian empire. We are on the other side: we represent the democratic world. We must defend democratic values, everything that has given us prosperity, freedom, and well-being. For this reason, increasing defence spending is unavoidable.

In recent months we have seen drones and airspace violations in several countries on the eastern and northern flanks. In Italy there is not the same daily perception of “below-threshold” threats-those that are not open aggression but undermine democratic systems. Is there greater awareness among the Baltic and Nordic countries?

The drone issue is real. In Estonia we had a recent incident: a drone coming from Russian territory was safely shot down. Now we are building the systems needed to detect and neutralize this type of threat: radars, acoustic systems, interception capabilities. We work very closely with the Ukrainians, who have developed extraordinary experience in countering drones in the war.

Today the information coming from Ukraine is essential. Kyiv has already given us many practical tips on how to deal with this problem. The methods of warfare have changed, but three things remain fundamental: speed, focus on the essentials, and close cooperation with allies.

There is another point. Russia tries to accuse us by claiming Baltic airspace was used to strike its territory. There have even been more absurd accusations that drones launched from the Baltics were responsible. That is completely false.

In Italy a theory has also circulated that the Baltic countries are preparing an attack on Russia.

That is totally false. The Baltic countries have no such plan. These claims, these propaganda arguments, only serve to distract from a simple fact: Russia is weak today. Ukraine is able to hit strategic targets-ports and critical infrastructure. Ukraine is achieving significant results and Russia is weakening.

That is why Moscow tries to shift attention by accusing others. But Russia should look at itself, at the crimes it has committed, at its aggression, and think about how to end the war justly. It is clear the war was started by Russia. Russia is the aggressor. It has committed many crimes on Ukrainian soil and must be brought to justice. Accountability-legal and political responsibility-is essential.

Speaking of accountability: how do you assess progress on the proposal for a special tribunal for the crime of aggression? More broadly, how do you judge Europe’s strategy in this new phase of the conflict?

There has been progress on holding Russia accountable. Member states of the Council of Europe have reached agreement on specific points and the process is moving forward. It is now up to parliaments. In Estonia we have already ratified these steps, starting with the special tribunal. I know several other countries will follow soon.

Establishing Russia’s responsibility is very important because it concerns the rule of law, international law, and the international order. It is essential to restore order and law in international relations. It is a matter of justice.

I see things moving forward. Even Hungary’s reengagement with the International Criminal Court is a sign: countries are taking accountability very seriously. This process will continue.

After Donald Trump’s election in the United States, Europe long waited for a negotiated solution led by Washington. Now there is the 90-billion-euro loan package for Ukraine and talk of a more central European role at the negotiating table. What should Europe’s strategy be to bring the war to an end?

At the moment it is clear Russia does not want to negotiate. It still thinks it can win the war. But what it is doing is desperate: using ballistic missiles against civilians in Kyiv is another stark example of the criminality of Putin’s regime.

We must continue to support Ukraine. The Ukrainians are militarily capable, they are advancing, they are motivated and they know how to defend themselves. That is the first point.

The second is to raise the cost of aggression for Russia. That means more sanctions and much stronger isolation. We see that sanctions work-they work very well.

The third is allied support for Ukraine. The 90-billion-euro loan is an important measure, but I believe there will be others, from European countries and other partners as well.

There are very clear signals that Russia is weaker than it has been in the past twenty years, or at least weaker than many presumed. It has lost the initiative in many areas, lost international standing, and is stuck in a war it cannot exit. But the war is also the main reason Putin remains in power: it is his project. That is why he continues.

So you see a weakened Russia, not one able to dictate terms?

Yes. Just look at what happened on May 9 in Moscow during the military parade. It was the most pathetic parade in Russian history. For the first time in a long time they did not display equipment in Red Square; they showed them only on video. The main reason is that they no longer have that equipment: it is at the front or has been destroyed. That sent a very clear signal: things are changing.

You have said that 2% of GDP for defence can no longer be seen as a goal but rather as a starting point. What, then, is a realistic benchmark for Europe?

The point is not to fix a symbolic figure. The point is to understand which capabilities are truly needed. We raised spending to 5.4% because we assessed the threat, our needs, and the strategic context. For Estonia today, that is a necessity.

Each country has its own budgetary situation and priorities, but all allies must understand that European security cannot be taken for granted. For many years in Europe, people assumed peace was permanent. Russia’s war against Ukraine has shown that is not the case.

The 2% target was an important political signal, but today it is no longer enough. We must build real capabilities: air defence, ammunition, anti-drone systems, military readiness, infrastructure, cyber defence, military mobility. The question should not be “how little can we spend,” but “what is needed to prevent Russia from thinking an attack could succeed.” Russia uses hybrid tools-propaganda, cyberattacks, energy pressure, disinformation campaigns. These threats affect everyone.

The security of the eastern and southern flanks are not in contradiction; they are part of the same European security. NATO works when every ally understands the threats others face and contributes to collective defence. (by Giorgio Rutelli)