The transatlantic alliance is undergoing a deep transformation. After a year marked by disputes over defense, trade and technology, the relationship between the United States and Europe is now in a rebalancing phase that could redefine Europe’s role on the global stage.
According to Alina Polyakova, president and CEO of the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA), a Washington think tank focused on Euro-Atlantic security, the war in Iran has temporarily frozen some of the tensions between the two sides of the Atlantic. Nonetheless, significant disagreements remain beneath the surface.
In this interview with Adnkronos – conducted on the sidelines of the “EU-US Tech Agenda 2030” conference organized by Formiche at the Chamber of Deputies, which was attended by Deputy Minister Valentino Valentini and Vice President of the Chamber Giorgio Mule, among others – Polyakova examines the new phase in Washington-Brussels relations, the role of European leaders in dealing with Donald Trump, and the future of U.S.-Europe technological cooperation.
How would you assess the current relationship between the United States and the European Union? Have the tensions of the past year eased or is the gap growing?
I think we are presently in a kind of stalemate, largely because the war in Iran has taken center stage. A significant portion of European public opinion disapproves of U.S. operations in Iran. But it is too early to predict the outcome, since we do not yet know how the conflict will end.
If I look at the past year, tensions were certainly present. Two symbolic moments stand out: the speeches at the Munich Security Conference by U.S. Vice President JD Vance and, a few weeks ago, by Secretary of State Marco Rubio.
I attended both and it is striking how much attitudes changed. The first speech was a shock for many Europeans. When the same message was reiterated by Rubio this year, it received a standing ovation.
This shows that a rebalancing of the transatlantic relationship has begun – a rebalancing that was long overdue.
But doesn’t this approach risk alienating longstanding allies?
There is no doubt that this “shock therapy” toward Europe can be unpleasant, given the depth of the alliance. At the same time, it was necessary. Europe is now doing more on defense and becoming more aware of its role in the world.
That said, over the past year we have seen tensions across nearly every dossier: security, defense, foreign policy, technology, and trade. We are now in a waiting phase: Europe needs time to deliver on its stated defense and competitiveness commitments, while the United States is focused on other priorities.
Among European governments there appears to be divergent approaches toward Washington. Giorgia Meloni and Friedrich Merz seem to seek closer dialogue with the Trump administration, while others, like Macron or Sanchez, distance themselves. From Washington’s perspective, who speaks for Europe today?
That’s a fundamental question. The United Kingdom ultimately backtracked on the issue of U.S. use of bases, but Spain created a significant rupture.
From Washington’s viewpoint the logic is simple: “We have supported Europe for 80 years, and now when we need your support you say no.” Many American policymakers find that unacceptable.
When some European leaders call the United States an unreliable partner, that hurts deeply in Washington. The American perception is the opposite: it was the U.S. that guaranteed European security for decades. Fortunately, that critical stance does not represent all of Europe; Spain’s government, in its extremity, seems to be an outlier.
If I ask you the classic Kissinger question, “what number do I dial to call Europe?”
Some leaders are emerging as particularly effective interlocutors for Donald Trump. Certainly Giorgia Meloni. Finnish President Alexander Stubb has a very direct relationship as well. Friedrich Merz also appears to maintain a positive connection with Washington.
But the real question is: what actually produces a strong personal rapport between leaders? Look at the relationship between Trump and Macron: it has been personally cordial since the first term. Yet what concrete benefits has France gained from that rapport? I do not see major tangible results.
This makes the position of European leaders complicated: they must preserve good relations with Washington while European public opinion often grows more critical of the United States.
From this perspective, I think Meloni manages that balance better than others: she maintains a good relationship with Trump, does not isolate Italy within Europe, and retains domestic support. Those are three difficult objectives to reconcile.
You are in Rome to discuss the transatlantic relationship. Is the tendency to open divides likely to become entrenched? Beyond Trump, do other contemporary American political figures share this approach?
The reality is that the transatlantic alliance will never return to what it once was. Frankly, I think that is a positive development. This rebalancing is painful but necessary. A model in which the United States paid for European security while Europe broadly followed U.S. direction without much influence was unsustainable.
Europe itself was no longer content with that arrangement. No leader wants to tell their public to simply follow Washington. Barack Obama had already signaled more diplomatically that the era of U.S. primacy on European affairs was ending and that Washington would shift focus to the Indo-Pacific. Yet little changed. Even after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine we did not see a true transformation. Real change came only after Trump’s reelection.
Despite the difficulties, I am actually quite optimistic about Europe’s future. This is a moment of truth – perhaps the most important since the end of World War II. It will require difficult political choices: increasing defense spending means diverting resources from other budget areas, possibly welfare, and that can cost governments significant popular support or even electoral defeat. The same applies to economic reforms needed to boost competitiveness.
A central issue in the debate is technological sovereignty. Europe is trying to build alternatives to the big American tech firms.
I will be blunt: that competition is already lost. There is no realistic scenario in which Europe can replace Amazon, Google or Microsoft. These firms built their positions over decades.
Today three American companies control roughly 70% of Europe’s cloud infrastructure. In Europe this is often seen as a dependency that weakens the continent. I view it differently: it is strategic interdependence, not simple dependence. What alternative exists? Europe lacks a unified capital market that could fund the investments and scale needed to create a rival to the Big Tech players. Do we really want to rely on Huawei, Tencent and other Chinese firms?
To put it simply: the United States is part of the West, China is not. I do not believe the Beijing regime can be relied upon to avoid political interference.
Europe still has major technological advantages. Three European companies control about two-thirds of the global market for physical network infrastructure – submarine cables, turbines, connectors.
There are also sectors where Europe remains very strong: biotechnology, quantum computing and lithography.
If Europe and the United States cooperate by leveraging these complementarities, they can compete with China. Acting separately would make it much harder for both. For this reason I believe Europe should move away from the idea of “digital sovereignty” and toward strategic interdependence.
Many Europeans fear this interdependence could become a tool of political pressure from Washington. There is concern about a “kill switch,” meaning the interruption of digital services by order or under pressure from the U.S. administration.
I understand these fears, but I think they are largely exaggerated. One must distinguish between government and the private sector. Imagine a U.S. president ordering Microsoft or Amazon to cut cloud services to Europe. Corporations would not comply, because doing so would cost them billions.
American multinationals have invested vast sums in Europe and employ hundreds of thousands of people there. Europe is a vital market. Such a decision would destroy their business models.
We saw something similar after the capture of Maduro in Venezuela: the CEO of ExxonMobil told Trump that Venezuela was “uninvestable,” and Trump complained, but the executive did not change his stance because he answers to shareholders and stakeholders.
And remember this: if corporations suddenly turned their backs on Europe, the message would immediately reach Japan, South Korea and Southeast Asia. No country would trust them anymore. In short, it would be economic suicide. For that reason I believe much of the rhetoric about “kill switches” is political posturing rather than economic reality.
Europe should see the world as it is, not as it wishes it to be. The reality is that the U.S.-Europe economic interdependence is vast. That foundation can underpin growth and prosperity in the coming years. (by Giorgio Rutelli)