Dissatisfaction is growing in Russia, but the Duma elections will not necessarily be the tool to measure it. According to Alexander Dunaev, an independent Russian political analyst and contributor to the online newspaper Meduza, the vote on September 18–20 will mainly serve the Kremlin to show that there is still popular backing for Vladimir Putin and his policies. “Elections are more of a symbolic thing meant to show that all Russians support what is being done,” Dunaev tells Adnkronos. “They are used to reconfirm the regime’s legitimacy and, consequently, the legitimacy of its aggressive policies.”
For Putin, then, the vote has chiefly political and symbolic value: to display the country’s unity behind the leadership and the war in Ukraine. “That is exactly why elections are held: to show that we are all united and led by our great leader,” Dunaev notes. For this reason, he adds, it is hard to identify a threshold of support or abstention that could become a genuine alarm bell for the Kremlin. “It is unlikely to be a wake-up call,” he says, also because “elections in Russia are not the same thing as in Italy or other democratic countries.”
Behind the expected result for United Russia, however, there are signs of growing discontent. “The Kremlin realizes the situation is difficult,” the analyst emphasizes. Even according to polls most favorable to the authorities, support for Putin’s party has fallen in recent months to around 30–33%. And, according to information leaked through opposition channels, the presidential administration reportedly lowered its target for United Russia from 55% to 45%. “Even there they understand that in such circumstances it is difficult to achieve a high result,” Dunaev observes.
The war also weighs on this mood, as after years it is beginning to affect Russians’ daily lives more directly. “The war is now in its fifth year,” the analyst recalls. For a long time the Kremlin tried to keep the conflict distant from most of the population, but “this year things have changed,” especially because of Ukrainian strikes on refineries and the resulting problems in fuel distribution. “Anyone who owns a car feels it.” The problem mainly affects the regions, while Moscow and Saint Petersburg are more protected: “Although in Saint Petersburg it is already being felt. There are already queues.”
The impact of raids and the war is also evident in commerce and everyday economic life. Dunaev points to the difficulties affecting Wildberries and Ozon, two e‐commerce giants that Kyiv considers crucial logistical links for the Russian military, explaining that problems at these companies “really affect millions and millions—not only consumers but also small entrepreneurs.” In this case too, the analyst says, “strong discontent is created.” But this discontent “is unlikely to turn into an electoral defeat for the ruling party.”
One sign in this regard, Dunaev says, is the case of Yabloko, initially allowed to run and then excluded. The party, the only one to take an openly anti‐war stance, reportedly reached “15–17%” in polls within a few weeks. “The very fact that so many people declared support for Yabloko is a clear sign that the population is tired and wants an end to the war.” Now, however, “all the parties that Russians will find on the ballots this weekend support the war.” For those unwilling to back the Kremlin, “there are no alternatives.”
For this reason, Dunaev believes the vote result could be used by Putin as proof of domestic backing for continuing the conflict. But the elections could have an even greater effect on how the war is managed after September 20. “If the authorities have to take difficult, unpopular decisions, they never do it before elections.” One such measure could be a new mobilization. “If in the minds of Putin and those around the Kremlin there is the idea of a resurgence of the conflict, of a further escalation, these measures will be implemented after September 20.” A new mobilization, he specifies, “will not be like in 2022,” because that earlier wave “was a shock for Russian society, and also a shock for the regime itself.”
Regarding the opposition and Alexei Navalny’s legacy, Dunaev thinks the movement is still active but deeply affected by its leader’s death. “It was a very heavy blow,” he says. “In such a strongly personalized organization, either you find a replacement for Navalny or you remain in crisis.” He notes that Yulia Navalnaya does not have the same political attributes as her husband. The Russian opposition has also “always been very fragmented,” with tensions even among the various groups opposing the Kremlin.
One positive element, according to Dunaev, is the cooperation between Navalny’s supporters and the opposition figure Maxim Katz on the “smart voting” strategy, which aims to identify, constituency by constituency, the most competitive candidate against United Russia, regardless of party. “The goal is to prevent candidates from the ruling party from winning.” Navalny’s followers, he concludes, “are in crisis,” but “they remain active” through videos, investigations and initiatives aimed at influencing the vote. Even in this election, “they try in some way to affect the electoral process, however difficult that may be under these conditions.”