The United States, and Donald Trump in particular, are in Beijing seeking a “success” that is now more necessary than ever amid the conflict with Iran, while China-aware of its current “position of strength”-presents itself as an interlocutor capable of speaking “eye to eye” with Washington and, according to Axel Berkofsky, ends up treating the American president like “a child at Disneyland.” This was the comment to Adnkronos by the professor at the University of Pavia and senior adviser to ISPI, on U.S. President Donald Trump’s ongoing visit to China and his face-to-face meeting with Chinese leader Xi Jinping.

According to Berkofsky, any thaw between Washington and Beijing should be read within a strong asymmetry in the balance of power: “The White House and the people around Trump, given the situation the United States find themselves in, obviously need a ‘friendly’ China.” This condition, he explains, is also linked to the international context: “The war against Iran is a total disaster, the Strait of Hormuz is closed, markets pretend otherwise, but the costs are enormous and Trump’s approval ratings are falling,” which is why the tycoon would need a political and diplomatic “success,” or at least to present the visit as such.

In this scenario, the analyst notes, Beijing arrives at the summit from a stronger position: “China knows that the United States are in a very difficult situation and comes to the summit from a position of strength, while the United States are in the position of having to produce something positive and China can wait.” More generally, he adds, “China is obsessed with the concept of ‘looking eye to eye’; it wants to be recognized as a superpower and for them the greatest rival is the United States and will always be so.” It is this awareness of Chinese strength that explains the pompous reception given to Trump in Beijing: “It’s like a country indulging a child who comes to visit Disneyland,” he added. “The U.S. is not a normal government; what it does is absurd, but it remains the world’s leading economic power and will continue to count.”

The Taiwan dossier remains the main element of tension. “If I were the president of Taiwan I would be worried,” Berkofsky says about the ambiguity of the Trump administration regarding support for the island, also recalling past discussions about a possible revision of the Taiwan Relations Act, which governs unofficial relations between Washington and Taipei. However, he clarifies, “even if the United States tomorrow said they were no longer interested in defending Taiwan, China would not invade tomorrow,” because the issue is primarily about “prestige” and meant for the domestic audience. Pressure on Taipei, he adds, is already evident in indirect forms: “What China is doing now is not an open war, but hybrid warfare: cyberwarfare, disinformation, intrusions into Taiwanese air and sea space thousands of times a year.” For this reason, he emphasizes, “Taiwan is already under pressure,” even without an immediate military scenario.

Finally, on China’s role in the Iranian crisis and in the Strait of Hormuz, Berkofsky highlights areas of influence but also concrete limits: “Whoever buys Iranian oil is China; 92% ends up in China… if China wanted to put Iran under pressure, it would certainly have the tools.” However, he concludes, “I don’t know if that is sufficient… China always watches conflicts from a distance, but it has very large economic leverage.”